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INTRODUCTION 
AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents the issue of whether recovery for 
emotional injuries should be governed by the same fluid rule of 
foreseeability which applies in tort cases generally, or whether 
emotional injury cases should be singled out and governed by 
some other, more mechanical, rule. The defendants have not 
disputed that the plaintiff's injuries are real and serious, and 
the courts generally acknowledge that emotional injury can just 
1 
as or more debilitating than physical injury.1 Defendants' 
assertion that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover is 
based instead on two primary arguments: (1) This Court has 
previously stated that recovery for negligently inflicted 
emotional injury is not allowed, and should not reconsider that 
decision, and (2) even if the Court were to allow recovery for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress in some cases, the 
Court should not do so in this case because plaintiff received 
no impact, was not in the zone of danger, and was not a family 
member of the decedent. 
Plaintiff has adequately addressed the first argument in 
his initial brief. Each of the prior statements by this Court 
concerning recovery for negligently inflicted emotional injury 
must be considered dictum. At best, the issue was a minor one 
in each prior Utah case and not fully and adequately briefed or 
considered. More importantly, stare decisis, standing- alone, is 
a very weak basis for decision. While plaintiff would concur 
that this Court should not abandon long-established precedents 
without good cause, the Court should similarly not hesitate to 
reexamine and overrule its decisions if warranted. 
The second argument made by defendants, that plaintiff 
should not recover under any rule of decision, is addressed 
below. The rules of decision announced by the various courts 
have been grouped generally under three broad categories: The 
^ee, for example, the quotation from Johnson v. Ruark 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A., 365 S.E.2d 909, 916 
(N.C. App. 1988), set forth on page 9 of this brief. 
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impact rule, the zone of danger rule and the foreseeability 
rule. Plaintiff has stated a cause of action under each of 
these rules. With respect to the impact rule, plaintiff's 
Complaint supports the inference, or in the alternative, 
plaintiff should be granted leave to amend its Complaint to 
clearly state, that plaintiff suffered physical consequences 
from the emotional distress, including sleeplessness and 
nightmares, with a result that he is not as physically active as 
he might otherwise have been. These allegations are sufficient 
under the impact rule. 
With respect to the zone of danger rule, Jesse Brown was in 
the same elevator which killed his best friend. The elevator 
had to be cut open to allow Jesse to escape. Jesse was clearly 
within the zone of danger. 
The foreseeability rule is really no rule at all, but an 
acknowledgement that emotional injury cases should be governed 
by the same rules of foreseeability as apply to tort cases 
generally. Defendants assert that even under the foreseeability 
rule, plaintiff would be denied recovery because he was not a 
close family member of the deceased. The objective of the 
courts which purport to require a close family relationship, 
however, is simply to insure that a defendant be required to 
compensate only injuries which were foreseeable. It was clearly 
foreseeable that Jesse would suffer serious emotional injury 
from witnessing the death of his best friend. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FORESEEABILITY RULE SHOULD NOT BE 
RIGIDLY LIMITED TO CERTAIN SPECIFIED RELATIONSHIPS. 
The foreseeability rule is followed today by more states 
than any single rule. Defendants challenge the applicability of 
the foreseeability rule on two grounds. First, defendants claim 
that many of the decisions cited in appellant's initial brief 
were not bystander cases and should not be considered per-
suasive. Second, defendants claim that the foreseeability 
"rule" limits recovery to close family members only. These 
claims are addressed in order: 
Defendants claim that, of 34 jurisdictions listed in 
plaintifffs initial brief as following the foreseeability rule, 
only 16 are bystander cases. Defendants argue, apparently, that 
rules of decision announced in non-bystander cases involving 
emotional distress are not relevant to bystander cases. This 
entirely misses the point. The benefit and advantage of 
expressing the rule in terms of foreseeability is the elimina-
tion of a special rule for bystander cases. 
One of the cases which defendants apparently claim was not 
a bystander case is Hunslev v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 
1096 (1976) . Hunsley was sitting in her living room when her 
neighbor drove her care into Hunsley's back porch utility room, 
and sued to recover for the emotional injuries she suffered. 
The trial court dismissed her complaint, and the Washington 
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Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The court made a 
thorough review of the various rules, and then stated: 
It is apparent from a survey of this area of the 
law that the application of the various rules, their 
exceptions and aberrations, has led the courts to 
reach absurd results and created numerous artificial 
boundaries. Rather than add to the already existing 
confusion with the formulation of a new rule, we 
conclude that the wisest approach is to return to the 
traditional principles, theories, and standards of 
tort law. Thus we test the plaintiff's negligence 
claim against the established concepts of duty, 
breach, proximate cause and damage or injury. 
[W]e conclude that the plaintiff who suffers 
mental distress has a cause of action; that is to say, 
the defendant has a duty to avoid the negligent 
infliction of mental distress. It is not necessary 
that there be any physical impact or the threat of an 
immediate physical invasion of the plaintiff's 
personal security. Our experience tells us that 
mental distress is a fact of life. With adequate 
limitations, the courts can administer the 
adjudication of this tort just as it [sic] does the 
complex intricacies of products liability and medical 
malpractice. 
553 P.2d at 1102-03 (citation omitted). 
In any event, Jesse Brown in a very real sense was not a 
bystander, but was a direct victim of the same negligence which 
claimed the life of JoeDee Quinn. Plaintiff, then only ten 
years old, was trapped in the same elevator. It would be 
reasonable for a jury to conclude that much of his emotional 
injury was a direct result of being himself trapped inside an 
elevator with an alarm button that did not function and controls 
which did not work properly. He experienced a significant 
period of panic before his frantic cries for help were answered. 
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Defendants' second challenge to the foreseeability rule is 
the claim that non-family members are automatically excluded 
from its protection. Such a mechanical approach defeats the 
very purpose of adopting a foreseeability standard as opposed to 
one of the other more mechanical rules. This was clearly 
explained by the Supreme Court of Washington. Addressing the 
issue of the class of persons which may bring an action for the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court in Hunsley 
v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976), wisely stated: 
We decline to draw an absolute boundary around 
the class of persons whose peril may stimulate the 
mental distress. This usually will be a jury question 
bearing on the reasonable reaction to the event unless 
the court can conclude as a matter of law that the 
reaction was unreasonable. 
553 P.2d at 1103 (citation omitted). See also Wright v. Arcade 
School District, 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 277, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812, 
815 (1964)(foreseeability is question of fact). 
That a ten year old boy will suffer severe emotional injury 
from witnessing the death of his best friend, with whom he has 
spent most of his waking hours, is certainly just as foreseeable 
as it would be among family members who perhaps were not very 
close or were even antagonistic. Yet the construction of the 
foreseeability rule advocated by defendants would deny recovery 
in the one case while allowing it in the other. To adopt such a 
mechanical limitation would constitute a denial of equal 
protection of the laws. To deny recovery to plaintiff without a 
trial would be to hold that his emotional injuries are not 
serious (which at this stage of the action has not been dis-
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puted) or that his injuries were not foreseeable. Neither 
proposition is correct. 
Defendants also challenge certain of the states included in 
plaintiff's listing of states which follow the foreseeability 
rule. Plaintiff acknowledges, after rereading the cases, that 
some were cited in error, and apologizes for the error.2 Even 
eliminating all such cases which were mis-cited or where the 
rule of decision is unclear, however, the foreseeability rule 
must still be characterized as the majority rule, followed by 
more states than any other single rule. Utah, once a leader in 
the area of recovery for emotional injuries, remains as having 
the most restrictive rule in the nation. 
Defendants call attention to the fact that plaintiff cited 
the case of Selsnick v. Horton, 96 Nev. 944, 620 P. 2d 1256 
(1980), as being a case which applied the foreseeability rule. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that that case purports to require 
intentional injury as a prerequisite for recovery for emotional 
injury, and that the case was cited in error. The proposition 
for which the case was cited, however, is still correct. In 
State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1985), the Nevada Supreme 
Court stated that the issue of recovery of damages for emotional 
distress caused by witnessing the death of another was an issue 
of first impression in Nevada, id. at 1374, and adopted a 
2A listing of the cases, indicating the rule of decision as 
claimed by each party, is attached as Appendix "A" for the 
Court's convenience. 
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foreseeability rule of liability. Id. at 1376-79.3 Inexplic-
ably, the court in Eaton did not refer to the prior decision in 
Selsnick. 
The North Carolina case of Ledford v. Martin, 87 N.C. App. 
88, 359 S.E.2d 505 (1987), review denied. 321 N.C. 473, 365 
S.E.2d 1 (1988), does state that a physical injury is a pre-
requisite to bringing a claim for emotional injury in that 
state. A later North Carolina case, however, reveals that the 
requirement of a physical injury is more illusory than real. 
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A., 3 65 
S.E.2d 909 (N.C. App. 1988). Johnson also demonstrates the 
artificial reasoning which courts find necessary when they have 
adopted a rule different from the "foreseeability" rule applied 
in most other areas of tort law. 
Johnson involved a claim for medical malpractice brought by 
the parents of a stillborn fetus. The parents alleged that the 
doctors1 failure to properly treat the mother's diabetic 
condition caused their child to die of malnutrition. Each 
parent claimed damages for emotional injuries. The court had 
little difficulty finding that the mother had suffered the 
requisite physical injury, but the father's claim required more 
3Although the plaintiff in Eaton had suffered a dislocated 
ankle in the accident which claimed her daughter's life, the 
emotional injuries complained of were not related to the injury 
to the ankle. The court expressly criticized decisions which 
purported to require a physical injury, but which allowed 
recovery for emotional injuries not related to the physical 
injury. Id. at 137 5. 
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inventive logic. The court first noted that the distinction 
between "physical" and "emotional" injury is nebulous at best: 
As to the "physical injury" requirement for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress, we first 
note as a preliminary matter that a physical "injury" 
is not required in North Carolina where "coincident in 
time and place with the occurrence producing the 
mental stress, some actual physical impact" is caused 
to the plaintiff. [Citation.] However, absent some 
impact, the emotional distress claimant must manifest 
some resulting physical injury. [Citation.] Further-
more, where the claim for emotional distress is 
otherwise proper, our courts do not bar recovery 
simply because strictly separating "physical" from 
"mental" injuries is difficult: 
[T]he general principles of the law of 
torts support a right of action for physical 
injuries resulting from either a willful or 
a negligent act none the less strongly 
because the physical injury consists of a 
wrecked nervous system instead of wounded or 
lacerated limbs, as those of the former 
class are frequently much more painful and 
enduring than those of the latter. 
May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 422, 72 
S.E. 1059, 1061 (1911); accord Stanback v. Stanback. 
297 N.C. 181, 199 n. 1, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 n. 1 
(1981). Given the difficulty distinguishing "physi-
cal" from "mental" injuries, we also note numerous 
courts have rejected requiring separate allegation or 
even proof of a physical injury in connection with 
negligently inflicted emotional distress. E.g., Saint 
Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 
1987) ; Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 
Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980). 
365 S.E.2d at 916. 
The court in Johnson noted other decisions which had found 
the necessary physical injury where the distress resulted in 
such symptoms as "nervousness, weight loss, confinement in bed 
and other ailments." 365 S.E.2d at 918 (citation omitted). The 
court held that Mr. Johnson had adequately alleged the element 
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of physical injury, and reversed the trial court's dismissal of 
the complaint. 
Defendants correctly point out that the court in Hatfield 
v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest. 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 
(1980), did not adopt a foreseeability standard as claimed by 
plaintiff in his initial brief, but rather continued to require 
some physical manifestation of the emotional injury.4 Hatfield, 
however, involved a claim for emotional injury resulting from a 
breach of contract. Subsequent Idaho decisions indicate that 
Idaho has not yet adopted any rule of recovery for non-contract 
cases. In Brown v. Fritz. 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 (1985), 
the court reexamined and affirmed the Hatfield rule in the 
contract context, but was careful to emphasize that its holding 
was limited to contract cases. 699 P.2d at 1377. 
Defendants also claim that to allow recovery in this case 
would be to adopt a rule vastly more liberal than any other 
state in the nation. Such is not the case. Although several 
states have stated that a close family relationship will 
normally be required, defendants did not cite, and plaintiff has 
not discovered, any cases which actually deny recovery to a best 
friend with a relationship as close as that in the instant case. 
4It is important to note that Idaho does not require that 
there be a physical impact or contact, but only that the 
emotional injury be sufficiently serious that its effects are 
physically observable. Compare Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 
of Central South Dakota, Inc.. 414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 1987), where 
the court, while not deciding which rule it would follow, held 
that the requirement of physical impact was satisfied where the 
only physical symptoms were nausea and diarrhea. 
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Furthermore, even if it would result in a more liberal rule, 
this Court should decline to place artificial limits on the 
right of recovery. The facts in this case, where Jesse Brown 
witnesses the painful and relatively slow death of his best 
friend/ and where Jesse himself was a direct victim of the same 
negligence, demand recovery. 
The injuries suffered by plaintiff were foreseeable. 
Plaintiff should be allowed to have a jury determine whether 
those injuries were caused by the negligence of defendants. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE ZONE OF DANGER. 
Defendants argue that plaintiff would not be allowed to 
recover under the zone of danger rule because he was safely 
located inside the elevator cage at the time that his friend was 
killed. It is true that with the benefit of hindsight, an adult 
might conclude that plaintiff was not in any danger. The zone 
of danger cases do not, however, require that the plaintiff be 
actually in danger. In each case, hindsight demonstrated that 
the danger was only perceived, not real, because the plaintiff 
received no physical injury. 
It must also be remembered that the zone of danger rule is 
a substitute for the foreseeability standard found in other 
areas of the tort law. The rule attempts to define that class 
of persons which might reasonably be expected to have suffered a 
serious emotional injury as a result of witnessing an injury to 
another. Plaintiff, a ten year old boy, certainly perceived 
11 
himself to be in danger. In addition, had his friend been 
successful in his experiment with the elevator, plaintiff would 
in all probability have tried the same experiment. 
Finally, that plaintiff was actually within the zone of 
danger is evidenced by the fact that plaintiff was trapped in 
the elevator. His emotional injuries from the incident were a 
result both of witnessing the death of his friend, and the 
terror of his own imprisonment in the elevator cage. Plaintiff 
has stated a cause of action under the zone of danger rule. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED 
A PHYSICAL INJURY WITHIN THE IMPACT RULE. 
In considering the sufficiency of the allegations of 
plaintiff's Complaint on this motion to dismiss, all inferences 
should be drawn in the light most favorable to plaintiff. The 
dismissal must be reversed unless this Court can "hold with 
certainty that plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in support of the 
claim.11 Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service, 
Inc. , 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605, 608 (1970) (emphasis in 
original). The decree of specificity required was explained by 
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in the case of Johnson v. 
Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A*, 365 S.E.2d 909 
(N.C. App. 1988). One of this issues in that case was whether 
the plaintiff's husband had suffered a physical impact as a 
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result of the defendant's negligence which allegedly killed his 
unborn child. The Court quoted from an earlier case as follows: 
Although it is clear that plaintiff must show some 
physical injury resulting from the emotional 
disturbance caused by defendant's alleged conduct, 
given the broad interpretation of "physical injury" in 
our case law, we think her allegation as she suffered 
great mental anguish and anxiety is sufficient to 
permit her to go to trial upon the question of whether 
the great mental anguish and anxiety (which she 
alleges) has caused physical injury. 
365 S.E.2d at 918 (quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 187, 
198-99, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1981)). 
The Court in Johnson then continued to hold that "Mr. 
Johnson's pleadings reveal no fact which would as a matter of 
law prohibit him from later more specifically forecasting or 
introducing that his alleged mental distress resulted in the 
necessary physical injury." 365 S.E.2d at 918. 
As set forth in plaintiff's initial brief, and in this 
reply brief, the degree of physical injury necessary to support 
a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional injury is 
very slight, and amounts to only a requirement that there be 
some objective evidence that an injury has been suffered. The 
existence of a physical manifestation can be inferred from the 
facts alleged in plaintiff's Complaint. In the alternative, 
plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint to 
allege the necessary physical impact. See Moviecolor Ltd. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co• , 288 F.2d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1961) (court on 
appeal has power to remand with instructions that trial court 
entertain motion to amend). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants do not dispute that Jesse Brown was emotionally 
traumatized. His injuries are real and will affect him more 
severely and for much a longer time than many physical injuries 
for which the courts would allow recovery. No rational rule can 
be set forth which would justify continuing to deny redress for 
such claims. This case should be remanded to the trial court 
for trial. 
DATED this 27th day of June, 1988. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
FRED D. HOWARD, and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
27th day of June, 1988. 
Mr. Ray Phillips Ivie 
Attorney $t Law 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 N. University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84601 
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APPENDIX "A" 
SUMMARY OF RULES BY STATE 
Appellant 
Claims 
Respondent 
Claims 
Alabama: Taylor v. Baptist Medical 
Center. Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 
(Ala. 1981) 
Alaska: Tommy's Elbow Room. 
Inc. v. Kavorkian. 727 P.2d 1038 
(Alaska 1986) 
Arizona: Keck v. Jackson. 122 Ariz. 114, 
593 P.2d 668 (1979) 
A r k a n s a s : M i d w e s t B u s l i n e s . 
Inc. v. Johnson. 291 Ark. 304, 724 
S.W.2d 453 (1987) 
California: Dillon v. Legg. 68 Cal. 2d 
728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 
912 (1968) 
Colorado: Towns v. Anderson. 195 Colo. 
517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978) 
Connecticut: Montinieri v. Southern 
New England Telephone Co.. 175 
Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978) 
Delaware: Robb v. Pennsylvania Railroad 
Co.. 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 
(1965) 
Florida: Champion v. Gray. 478 So. 2d 
17 (Fla. 1985) 
Georgia: Hamilton v. Powell. Goldstein. 
Frazer & Murphy. 252 Ga. 149, 
311 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1984) 
Hawaii: Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply 
Ltd.. 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 
(1975) 
Idaho: Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons 
Northwest. 100 Idaho 840, 606 
P.2d 944 (1980) 
foreseeability not bystander 
foreseeability same 
zone of danger same 
impact rule same 
foreseeability same 
zone of danger same 
foreseeability non-bystander 
zone of danger same 
foreseeability non-bystander 
impact rule same 
foreseeability same 
foreseeability impact 
Appellant 
Claims 
Respondent 
Claims 
Illinois: Rickey v. Chicago Transit 
Authority, 98 111. 2d 546, 457 
N.E.2d 1 (1983) 
Indiana: Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Co.. 223 Ind. 425, 61 
N.E. 2d 326 (1945) 
Iowa: Barnhill v. Davis. 300 N.W.2d 104 
(Iowa 1981) 
Kansas: Hoard v. Shawnee Mission 
Medical Center. 233 Kan. 267, 662 
P.2d 1214 (1983) 
Kentucky: Deutsch v. Shein. 597 S.W.2d 
141 (Ky. 1980) 
Louisiana: Todd v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co.. 219 So. 2d 538 
(La. 1969); Mesa v. Burke. 506 
So. 2d 121 (La. App.), cert, 
denied. 506 So.2d 1226 (La. 1987) 
Maine: Rowe v. Bennett. 514 A.2d 802 
(Me. 1986) 
Maryland: Vance v. Vance. 286 Md. 490, 
408 A.2d 728 (1979) 
Massachusetts: Dziokonski v. Babineau. 
380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978) 
Michigan: Wargelin v. Sisters of Mercy 
Health Corp.. 385 N.W.2d 732 
(Mich App. 1986) 
Minnesota: Stadler v. Cross. 295 N.W.2d 
552 (Minn. 1980) 
Mississippi: First National Bank 
v. Langlev. 314 So. 2d 324 (1975) 
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